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ALD-142                NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1101 
___________ 
 
MARILYN KENT, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL HERIDIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-07791) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 29, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit 
(Opinion filed:  April 13, 2012) 
Judges 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Marilyn Kent appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing her complaint.  Because 
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this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.  See
I. 
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In December 2011, Kent filed suit against Michael Heridia, from whom she 
apparently leased a barn in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, to house her horses.  Her 
complaint asserted that Heridia had violated several criminal statutes when, in 2002, a 
loud piece of machinery that he was using scared one of her horses, causing it to injure 
itself and leaving it unable to race.  Kent stated although she reported the incident to the 
Dublin, Pennsylvania police, they did nothing “to uphold the crimes code” due to their 
corruption.  She also seemed to assert that Heridia discriminated against and harassed 
her, and would not allow a veterinarian to check on the horse.  Kent’s claim for relief 
stated that she sought $5 million for “crime, corruption, loss and inability to proceed” 
because “this horse was a winner.”  
  The District Court granted Kent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and at the 
same time dismissed the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  The District Court first 
explained that, Kent, as a private citizen, did not have the right to bring a criminal case 
against Heridia.  Additionally, she could not bring a breach of contract action under the 
District Court’s diversity jurisdiction because both she and Heridia are Pennsylvania 
residents.  Finally, the District Court stated that the events giving rise to the complaint 
occurred in 2002, and thus, “[r]egardless of what type of action plaintiff is attempting to 
bring . . . it is now time-barred and must be dismissed for that reason.”  
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 Kent now appeals. 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is plenary.  
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  If a complaint is vulnerable to 
dismissal, a district court generally must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative 
amendment.  See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 
252 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that in civil rights cases, “leave to amend must be granted 
sua sponte before dismissing” the complaint).  However, dismissal without leave to 
amend is justified on grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.  Alston v. 
Parker
 Here, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without providing 
Kent with an opportunity to amend her complaint, because any such amendment would 
be futile.  
, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). 
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   As 
the District Court determined, it was apparent from the face of the complaint that the 
allegations, to the extent that they even constituted actionable claims, were time-barred.  
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may sua 
sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the 
complaint and no further development of the record is necessary.  See, e.g., Fogle v. 
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).   
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 In this case, the events that gave rise to the complaint occurred in 2002.  Kent did 
not, however, file her federal cause of action until 2011.  To the extent that she sought to 
raise a breach of contract or tort claim due to the injuries to her horse, those claims are 
subject to statutes of limitations of two and four years, respectively.  See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5525 (breach of contract claims); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7) (tort 
claims).  In addition, insofar as Kent sought to raise a civil rights claim against the Dublin 
police department, such a claim is subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury claims.  See Lake v. Arnold
 Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that Kent cannot bring any type of 
criminal claim against Heridia, as private persons do not have a “judicially cognizable 
interest in the prosecution . . . of another.”  
, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 
2000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7).  Accordingly, it is apparent from the face of the 
complaint that the statutes of limitations expired well before Kent filed suit in federal 
court.    
See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
, 410 U.S. 614, 
619 (1973).  
See
 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
